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Note
The Eighth Circuit Struggles with
Strict Tort Liability in Nebraska
Sherrill v. Royal Indus., Inc., 526 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
Product liability suits have captured the bar's interest for quite
some time.1 However, the relatively recent expansion of the law
in this area has resulted in many uncertainties, especially when the
theory of recovery is grounded in strict tort.2  While the theories
of negligence and implied warranty still exist,3 the adoption of
1. In 1962, one practicing attorney remarked:
In trial tactics, I was asked to cover products liability. We
have had considerable experience in our office recently in con-
nection with products liability cases. In fact, we have found
that it is hidden gold.
In these products liability cases you have three shots at
them.
First of all, you can proceed on the theory of negligence
Secondly, you can go to the breach of warranty and fitness
of use ....
Thirdly, you can bring your action under the old res ipsa
loquitur theory ....
National Association of Claimants' Counsel of America, Proper Han-
dling of a Tort Case from Beginning to End 115-16, Apr. 13, 1962.
2. See Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. Rnv. 713 (1970) (discussing revi-
sions of the Restatement drafts).
3. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would presumably not apply in a
strict tort suit, since under res ipsa the plaintiff must prove that a
product is defective. Proof may, however, be offered through circum-
stantial evidence. See Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191
N.W.2d 601 (1971); accord, Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d
649 (8th Cir. 1975).
Remedies also are available under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The relevant Code provisions, however, represent a codification of
product liability law in the midst of extreme changes. Consequently,
the Code is behind decisional law in many states. Its provisions pro-
vide an alternative, but frequently unsatisfactory and unused, basis
of recovery. See generally W. PRossER, HNmmoK OF THE LAw OF
ToRTs § 98, at 658 (4th ed. 1971).
This note's extensive reliance upon California law may be mislead-
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Restatement section 402A 4 and the decision in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,, have shifted the litigation focus to strict tort.
Although both Greenman and the Restatement appear to set out
the theory in relatively straight-forward terms, much discussion
has been generated concerning the true nature of such terms as
"defect" and "unreasonably dangerous," and concerning the estab-
lishment of defenses.6 Though the majority of states have adopted
strict tort in one form or another, the rationale varies.7 The law
in Nebraska is unclear, the Nebraska Supreme Court having
rendered decisions in only two or three cases involving strict tort.8
ing. Though in California (and presumably in Nebraska) strict lia-
bility is grounded in tort, strict liability under warranty is also a
viable theory. California is generally regarded as the most liberal in
allowing plaintiffs' recovery, but the apparent ease with which some
California courts apply the strict tort theory is deceiving. While ap-
plication of strict tort on the basis of warranty often leads to semantic
difficulties, the terms "defect," "unreasonably dangerous," and others,
present similar problems of definition and application under the tort
theory.
4. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
5. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
6. See Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have
To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for
Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L.
REv. 30 (1965); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contribu-
tory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972);
Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. Ruv. 363 (1965); Lambert, Tort Law, 35 J. Ass'N TRIAL
LAWYERs OF AM. 33, 84 (1974); Schwartz, A Products Liability Primer,
33 J. Am. Ass'N OF TRIAL LAWYERs 64 (1970); Comment, Products Lia-
bility: For the Defense-Contributory Fault, 33 TENN. L. REV. 464
(1966); 6 CREmiHToN L. REv. 434 (1973); Note, Products Liability and
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286 (1966);
Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 352 (1973).
For an interesting discussion of a dispute in one jurisdiction over
whether contributory negligence or assumption of the risk is the cor-
rect defense to an action in strict tort see Groark, Contributory Neg-
ligence-An Integral Part of Product Liability Cases, 56 ILL. B.J. 904
(1968), and Postilion, Strict Liability and Contributory Negligence:
The Two Just Don't Mix, 57 ILL. B.J. 26 (1968).
7. See 1 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 1 4060, for the current status of strict
liability by state.
8. Strict liability in tort was adopted in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187
Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971), and partially clarified in Hawkins
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973). The
cause of action was before the court again in Friedrich v. Anderson,
191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974), though there is some question
whether the Friedrich opinion actually considered the strict tort issue.
See Note, Second Impact Liability in Nebraska, 54 NEB. L. REV. 172
(1975), which concludes that the court grounded its decision on the
negligence theory, and that it failed to consider either the breach of
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There has been disagreement nationally over the establishment of
defenses," but only one Nebraska case has reached this issue.10
In Sherrill v. Royal Industries, Inc.," the court was faced with
issues involving both the plaintiff's prima facie case and the
defenses to that case. The court looked to Nebraska law on the
issues, the ultimate issue centering around the defense of assump-
tion of the risk. The appeal focused solely on the trial court's jury
instructions. Therefore this note will analyze both the court's
interpretation of Nebraska law and the jury instructions in some
detail.
1 2
warranty or strict liability issues. See also 8 CREGHTON L. REv. 233
(1974).
Strict tort liability was central to the discussion in Bridgeford v.
U-Haul Co., 195 Neb. 308, 238 N.W.2d 443 (1976), which considered
the constitutionality of a statute holding truck lessors strictly liable.
The case holding, however, dealt only with the statute and did not
affect tort theory.
After Kohler, but before Hawkins, a case involving negligent design
reached the Nebraska court. See Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v.
L&M Paper Co., 189 Neb. 792, 205 N.W.2d 523 (1973). The case, deal-
ing solely with property damage, was, possibly for tactical reasons, not
tried on a strict liability theory. The Kohler court had declined to
reach the property damage issue in applying strict tort; and subse-
quently, in Hawkins, the court explicitly refused to extend strict tort
to pure property damage.
9. See, e.g., Lascher, supra note 6, at 51. Freedman, The Comparative
Negligence Doctrine Under Strict Liability: Defendant's Conduct Be-
comes Another "Proximate Cause" of Injury, Damage or Loss, 1975
INS. L.J. 468; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1147-48 (1960).
10. In Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643
(1973), the court held that assumption of the risk and product misuse
are defenses to strict tort, though contributory negligence (the failure
to discover a defect or guard against it) is not.
Noel contends that the issue of assumption of the risk in general,
as well as the specific delineation of the theory, is important in guiding
judges in the directing of verdicts. Noel, supra note 6, at 122, 128.
11. 526 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1975).
12. With only a few Nebraska cases in the area, the NEBRASKA JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS offer no instructions for strict tort liability. See NEBRASKA
SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NE-
BRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 11.20 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as NJI].
The value of pattern instructions has been recognized by the courts.
Nebraska Supreme Court Chief Justice Paul W. White commented:
It is the earnest hope of the Supreme Court that the use
of these Nebraska Pattern Jury Instructions will enhance the
operation of trial by jury, while substantially reducing the
number of cases in which we have had to set aside jury ver-
dicts because of erroneous instructions.
White, Foreword to NJI at vi (1969).
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the following rule in 1968:
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II. THE FACTS
The plaintiff, North Platte Sherrill, 13 purchased a grain auger
from W.R. Grace & Co., an implement dealer, in November, 1968.1
Royal Industries, Inc. manufactured the machine, but neither Grace
nor Royal fully assembled the product.'5 Sherrill, a farmer, put
the machine together himself.'
While using the auger in October, 1968, to carry grain from his
truck to his bin, Sherrill's clothing caught in the rotary drive shaft
and coupler which were located on the outside of the auger.' 7 His
clothing wound around the shaft, severing his left hand and causing
bruises, lacerations and loss of skin.18 Sherrill, afterwards, denied
he was aware of the danger of the rotating shaft.' 9
A diversity suit was commenced in Nebraska federal district
court against the dealer and the manufacturer. 20  The case was
tried and submitted to the jury2 ' solely on the theory of strict
tort liability for defective design of the auger.22 The defendants
(a) Whenever Nebraska Jury Instructions (NJI) contains an
instruction applicable in a Civil or Criminal Case, and the
Court, giving due consideration to the facts and the prevailing
law, determines that the jury should be instructed on the sub-
ject, the Nebraska Jury Instruction shall be used.
NJI at ix (1969).
Given the importance placed upon the pattern instruction, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions will
presumably move slowly and cautiously in adopting a strict tort in-
struction. It is hoped that the analysis in this note will be of practical
value to the practitioner in drafting instructions during the interim.
13. "North Platte" is, apparently, Mr. Sherrill's first name.




18. Id. Although the facts of Sherrill are not set forth in detail in the
case, the incident appears to have resulted from Mr. Sherrill's clothing
being caught in and wrapped around a power take-off shaft (PTO).
In one study of 100 farm accidents, a PTO was involved in 23.3% of
the cases. Farm Dep't., National Safety Council, Analysis of Portable
Farm Elevator and Auger Accidents to Determine Corrective Meas-
ures 9, Sept., 1969. The study further notes that "multiple injuries
are most often caused by contact with the power-take-off shaft." Id.
at 25.
19. 526 F.2d at 512.
20. Id. at 509.
21. Id. Recognition of this fact is of aid in evaluating the decision. One
of the major criticisms of Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217
N.W.2d 831 (1974), is that the court dismissed the case by affirming
the summary judgment granted below. See 8 CPmGHTON L. REv. 233,
247 (1974).
22. The weight of authority today recognizes strict liability in tort for de-
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alleged assumption of the risk, and the jury returned a general ver-
dict for the defendants. 23 After the trial court's denial of Sherrill's
motion for a new trial, he appealed, alleging that the lower court's
jury instructions were either erroneous or incomplete concerning
the definitions of assumption of risk and the term "unreasonably




A. Assumption of the Risk
The assumption of risk instruction given essentially stated that
if the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger of the auger shaft
but voluntarily chose to encounter the danger, he assumed the
risk.2r Though the appellant did not quarrel with the basic
fective design. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal Rptr. 629 (1970); W. PnossER,
supra note 3, § 96, at 644-45; cf. Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724,
217 N.W.2d 831 (1974); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturer's Negli-
gence as to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965);
Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962). But see Henderson, Judicial Review
of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
One court has observed that strict tort focuses on the condition of
a dangerous article designed in a particular way, whereas negligence
looks to the manufacturer's reasonableness in designing and selling the
article. Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Ore. 1974). That court, how-
ever, noted that there is probably little difference between the two
theories, since the factors considered in each are the same:
The comparative design with similar and competing ma-
chinery in the field, alternate designs and post accident modi-
fication of the machine, the frequency or infrequency of use
of the same product with or without mishap, and the relative
cost and feasibility in adopting other design [sic] are all rel-
evant to proof of defective design.
Id. at 129, quoting from Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196,
1202 (8th Cir. 1973); cf. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 420 (Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1970) (accident preventable through
installation of two-dollar switch).
23. 526 F.2d at 509.
24. Id. This note is limited to a discussion of two matters: (1) the as-
sumption of the risk instruction and (2) the inclusion of the phrase
"plaintiff was unaware of the defect" in the instruction setting forth
the necessary elements of the plaintiff's case. The Sherrill opinion
also considers the relevancy of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous"
in a strict tort case, and the manufacturer's duty to guard against "ob-
vious" dangers.
25. The instruction, as given, was:
You are instructed that in connection with the defense of "as-
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instruction, he contended that the jury should have been instructed
additionally that "inadvertence, momentary inattention, diversion
of attention, or involuntary slipping and falling do not constitute
assumption of even the most obvious risk. ' 26 The court rejected
this, stating the instruction as given correctly stated Nebraska
law.
27
In Nebraska, assumption of the risk and misuse of the product
are defenses to strict tort actions, while traditional contributory
negligence is not.28  Assumption of the risk, which involves a
choice made more or less deliberately without reference to any due
care by the plaintiff, occurs when the plaintiff knows of a danger-
ous condition, appreciates its danger and deliberately exposes him-
self to the danger and risk of injury.29  On the other hand
contributory negligence requires a failure of the plaintiff to exer-
cise due care to discover a defect or to guard against its presence.3 0
Assumption of the risk applies only to known dangers and the
plaintiff must have knowledge of the unreasonable character of the
risk: 31
sumption of risk," the burden is upon each defendant to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, each and all of the fol-
lowing propositions:
1. That the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger;
2. That the plaintiff voluntarily or deliberately exposed
himself to that danger; and
3. That as a proximate result of that danger, the injury
to the plaintiff occurred.
If a defendant has failed to establish any or. all of the
above-numbered propositions by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, you will disregard such defense as to that defendant.
If a defendant has established each of the above-numbered
propositions by a preponderance of the evidence, your verdict
will be in favor of that defendant and against the plaintiff.
526 F.2d at 510 n.4.
This instruction corresponds to NJI Nos. 2.02A, 3.31, with certain dele-
tions from the pattern instructions that refer to defendant's negligence.
NJI No. 3.31, was approved in Schmidt v. Johnson, 184 Neb. 643, 171
N.W.2d 64 (1969).
26. 526 F.2d at 510.
27. Id. The court also noted that the proposed clarification would not
have helped, since the plaintiff's testimony failed to show that these
factors were present. Id. n.5.
28. Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643
(1973); accord, REsTATEmEN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n
(1965). Traditional contributory negligence, the failure to discover a
defect or to guard against it, does not encompass product misuse.
29. Fritchley v. Love-Courson Drilling Co., 177 Neb. 455, 129 N.W.2d 515
(1964).
30. Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943).
31. Jensen v. Hawkins Constr. Co., 193 Neb. 220, 226 N.W.2d 346 (1975).
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[A] plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising from the
defendant's conduct unless he then knows of the existence of the
risk and appreciates its unreasonable character, or the danger
involved, including the magnitude thereof, and voluntarily accepts
the risk.3 2
Additionally, assumption of the risk is a jury question 3 3-- an affirm-
ative defense that must be pleaded and proved by the defendant. 34
The appellant's attempt in Sherrill to have the assumption of
the risk instruction clarified as to inadvertence and momentary
inattention has some support.35 However, the instruction as
given appears to follow the pattern jury instruction adopted in
Nebraska.
3 1
B. Plaintiff's "Unawareness" as Part of the Prima Facie Case
Although treated as a separate issue by the court, appellant's
32. Id. at 226, 226 N.W.2d at 350-51.
33. Barton v. Hobbs, 181 Neb. 763, 151 N.W.2d 331 (1967); Surface v. Safe-
way Stores, 169 F.2d 937 (8th Cir. 1948) (Nebraska law).
34. 177 Neb. 455, 129 N.W.2d 515 (1964).
35. See, e.g., W. PaossER, supra note 3, § 68, at 456; Elder v. Crawley Bock
Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971).
The following excerpt is from the transcript of a meeting sponsored
by the American Trial Lawyers Association (Eighth Circuit) and the
Nebraska Association of Trial Attorneys:
MR. [W.T.] BARNES: ... I know our various states differ
on assumption of risk .... With respect to Nebraska law,
will you tell us ... what are these things that you must
prove?
MR. [A.G. (Duke)] SCHATZ: There are just two things ...
which you must prove in Nebraska:
Number one, you must obviously prove knowledge by the
plaintiff of the known or alleged known dangerous condition.
Number two, you must prove the subsequent voluntary as-
sumption of the risk.
In that connection I point out the theory that . . . even
though the plaintiff knew of the situation, if there were a mo-
mentary distraction caused by the defendant himself, that
might get the plaintiff over the hurdle of the assumption of
the risk in Nebraska, in my opinion.
MR. BARNES: Because he did not assume the risk.
MR. SCHATZ: That's right.
MR. BARNES: Even though he had knowledge of it, he was
distracted, and therefore he did not assume it.
MR. SCHATZ: That's right.
American Trial Lawyers Association (Eighth Circuit) & Nebraska As-
sociation of Trial Attorneys, Techniques of Persuasion 19, May 14-15,
1965.
36. 526 F.2d at 11. See pp. 711-17 infra as to whether the definition of as-
sumption of the risk in negligence should to be modified in strict tort
cases.
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next contention actually is entwined with the assumption of risk
issue.
One of the trial court's instructions on the issues to be decided
in order to find the defendants liable was:
If you find that:
3. Mr. Sherill was unaware and had no reason to be aware of
the claimed defect;
You may then find the defendants or a defendant liable for the
injuries of Mr. Sherrill.
37
Although this instruction arguably was approved in Kohler v.
Ford Motor C0.38 because the Nebraska high court quoted the trial
court's instruction, the appellant argued this element of proof was
overruled in Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co.39 when the
court stated that traditional contributory negligence in the sense of
a failure to discover a defect or to guard against it, is not a defense
to a suit in strict tort. A brief discussion of the point by the
Nebraska Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions also concluded that it would be an error to require the
plaintiff to prove his unawareness of the defect.
40
The court of appeals rejected appellant's contention because the
implication of approval in Kohler was not specifically rejected in
Hawkins, and also the court did not find any harmful error even
if the instruction did shift the burden of proof.41  While the
court's analysis as to the latter is probably true, the questioned
instruction has a lineage which suggests it incorrectly states an ele-
ment of the plaintiff's case.
42
The leading case and one which Kohler looked to as "succinctly"
stating the fundamental principle of strict tort liability43 is Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 44 There Justice Traynor wrote:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
37. 526 F.2d at 510-11.
38. 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
39. 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
40. NJI, No. 11.20 comment (Supp. 1975).
41. 526 F.2d at 511.
42. Throughout its opinion, the court suggested that the case lacks sub-
stance; and in one part it noted, somewhat skeptically, Sherrill's asser-
tion that he did not know that the revolving shaft was dangerous.
Clearly, Mr. Sherrill did not arouse the court's sympathies.
43. 187 Neb. at 36, 191 N.W.2d at 607.
44. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965).
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defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being.45
But later in the opinion Traynor apparently attempted to clarify
the theory:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plain-
tiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith [the
defective product] in a way it was intended to be used as a result
of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not
aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.46
Kohler looked to the first Greenman passage:
We hold that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he placed in the market, knowing that it is to be used with-
out inspection for defects, proves to have a defect which causes an
injury to a human being rightfully using that product.
47
However the trial court instruction in Kohler evidently followed
the second Greenman formulation, at least in part, stating:
To recover against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence: . . . 3. The plaintiff was unaware of
the claimed defect.48
It is more likely, given the date of the trial and the similarity in
wording, that plaintiff's attorneys in Kohler submitted instructions
to the court patterned after the California Jury Instructions, Civil
45. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
46. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (emphasis added).
47. 187 Neb. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 606.
48. Id. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 607. The instruction as given by the trial
court was, in part:
To recover against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence: 1. The defendant placed
the 1960 Ford Falcon automobile in question on the market
for use, and the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reason-
able care should have known, that the automobile would be
used without inspection for defects in the steering sector
shaft; 2. The steering sector shaft was in a defective condition
at the time it was placed on the market and left the defend-
ant's possession; 3. The plaintiff was unaware of the claimed
defect; 4. The claimed defect was the proximate cause or a
proximately contributing cause of any injury to the plaintiff
occurring while the automobile was being used in the way and
for the general purpose for which it was designed and in-
tended; 5. The defect, if it existed, made the automobile un-
reasonably dangerous and unsafe for its intended use; 6. The
plaintiff sustained damages as the direct and proximate result
of the claimed defect ....
Id. Compare this instruction with THE Coi n=irT=r ON STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Crvm No. 9.01 (5th ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as BAJI], note 49, infra.
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(BAJI) . 9 Language similar to that in Kohler and Sherrill was
used by the trial courts in two post-Greenman California cases-
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.50 and Luque v. McLean.5 1 These
two cases make up a major part of the disputed instruction's
history.
While the Cronin opinion was concerned primarily with whether
the plaintiff had to prove that the defect was "unreasonably
dangerous" as Restatement section 402A requires, the "unaware of"
language was present in the trial court's instruction.52 However
Justice Sullivan, in Cronin, deferred to his opinion rendered the
same day in Luque for construction of the awareness language. 53
In Luque, the plaintiff fell while clearing debris from his lawn
mower's path.54  His hand went into an unguarded hole in the
housing and was mangled.55  Although the suit was originally
brought in negligence, breach of warranty and strict tort, the plain-
tiff withdrew all counts at the close of the evidence except the one
grounded in strict liability.5 r The trial judge withdrew the
49. Kohler was decided in 1971. At that time, the following instruction,
recommended in California, appears to have been the basis for at least
part of the Kohler instruction.
The defendant . . . (manufacturer) (retailer) . . . is not
required under the law so to create and deliver its product
as to make it accident proof; however, he is liable to the
plaintiff for any injury suffered by him if the plaintiff estab-
lishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts nec-
essary to prove each of the following conditions:
First: The defendant placed the in question
on the market for use, and the defendant knew, or in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care should have known, that the particu-
lar would be used without inspection for defects
in the particular part, mechanism or design which is claimed
to have been defective;
Second: The was defective in design or man-
ufacture at the time it was placed on the market and deliv-
ered;
Third: The plaintiff was unaware of the claimed defect;
Fourth: The claimed defect was a [proximate] [legal]
cause of any such injury to the plaintiff occurring while the
was being used in the way and for the general
purpose for which it was designed and intended, and
Fifth: The defect, if it existed, made the un-
reasonably dangerous and unsafe for its intended use.
BAJI, supra note 48.
50. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
51. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
52. 8 Cal. 3d at 127 n.5, 501 P.2d at 1158 n.5, 104 CaL Rptr. at 438 n.5.
53. Id. at 130 n.11, 501 P.2d at 1160 n.11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 440 n.ll.
54. 8 Cal. 3d at 140, 501 P.2d at 1166, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 140-41, 501 P.2d at 1166, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
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assumption of the risk instruction due to insufficient evidence. 57
After a verdict and judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff
appealed. 58
The primary contention and the issue which Justice Sullivan
specifically addressed was whether or not the plaintiff had to estab-
lish that he was not aware of the defect at the time of the acci-
dent. The thrust of plaintiff-appellant's argument was directed at
sub-part three of the jury instruction2 9
The Luque court undertook a detailed review of Greenman and
concluded the plaintiff's burden in a products liability case is met
if he establishes ingredients to meet Traynor's first Greenman
formulation201
After an analysis of the evolution of the California Jury Instruc-
tions, concerning strict products liability, the Luque court con-
cluded that the instruction committee based its recommended
instruction on the second formulation in Greenman instead of the
first,"' which Luque reaffirmed as stating California law.62  The
court specifically rejected the notion that the plaintiff had to prove
he was unaware of the defect.
63
Ordinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a
strict liability action. "The only form of plaintiff's negligence
that is a defense to strict liability is that which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, more commonly referred to as assumption of risk. For
57. Id. at 141, 501 P.2d at 1166, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
58. Id.
59. The complete instruction was:
In this action, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary
to prove the following issues:
1) That the mower manufactured and sold by the defend-
ants was defective at the time of the accident, and
2) That the defect, if any, existed at the time of manu-
facture and sale of the mower,
3) That the Plaintiff was not aware of the defect, if any,
at the time of the accident, and
4) That the plaintiff was using the mower in a manner
in which it was intended to be used, and
5) That said defect, if any, was a proximate cause of the
injury to the plaintiff, and
6) The nature and extent of the injuries, and
7) The amount of damages.
Id. at 141 n.1. (Emphasis added by the court to indicate contested
portions of the instruction).
60. Id. at 141, 501 P.2d at 1166-67, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
61. Id. at 141-42, 501 P.2d at 1167, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
62. See pp. - supra for the two Greenman passages.
63. 8 Cal. 3d at 146, 501 P.2d at 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
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such a defense to arise, the user or consumer must become aware
of the defect and danger and still proceed unreasonably to make
use of the product."64
The Luque court further indicated that the defendant had the bur-
den of establishing the defense,6 5 and reversed the lower court
judgment for the defendants, finding that the instruction imposed
a prejudicially erroneous burden of proof on the plaintiff.
66
Not surprisingly, the California Committee on Standard Jury
Instructions-Civil responded to the Luque opinion. According to
the committee, the pre-Luque instructions were designed to express
California law in accordance with Greenman and Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co.07 For comparison purposes the pertinent portions
of the instructions are set out in the footnotes."" In 1972, BAJI No.
64. Id. at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50, quoting from
Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 243, 71 Cal. Rptr.
306, 314 (Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1968). The Restatement provides:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of
its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory neg-
ligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably pro-
ceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or con-
sumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the prod-
uct and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment n (1965).
65. 8 CaL 3d at 145-46, 501 P.2d at 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
66. Id. at 139, 501 P.2d at 1165, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 445. See also 6 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 434, 439 n.23 (1973) (concise discussion of Luque hold-
ing); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manu-
facturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1065, 1094-96 (1973) (characteriging California approach as "anti-
402A"); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment,
60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1294 (1974); Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Wein-
stein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52
TEX. L. REv. 1303, 1305 & n.13 (1974).
67. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.. 896 (1964). See BAJI No.
9.00, comment at 276.
68. BAJI No. 9.00-01, were either individually or together, intended to de-
fine strict tort.
The [manufacturer] [retailer] of an article who places it
on the market for use under circumstances where he knows
that such article will be used without inspection for defects
in the particular part, mechanism, or design which is claimed
to have been defective, is liable for injuries proximately
caused by defects in the manufacture or design of the article
which caused it to be unreasonably dangerous and unsafe for
its intended use and of which the user was not aware, pro-
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9.00 was revised to reflect the Luque and Cronin opinions;69 BAJI
No. 9.01 was disapproved and deleted by the committee.70 Also in
response to Luque, the committee published BAJI No. 9.02, which
set forth the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk.71
vided the article was being used for the purpose for which
it was designed and intended to be used.
[An article is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics.]
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a prepon-
derance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to prove
each of the foregoing conditions.
BAJI No. 9.00 (bracketed portions by the committee). The middle par-
agraph defining "unreasonably dangerous" is common to instructions
9.00 and 9.01. See note 49 supra. In one article critical of the jury
instructions formulated for strict tort prior to Nos. 9.00 and 9.01, the
author failed to address the "awareness" issue. See Lascher, supra
note 6, at 48-51, 62.
69. The - of an article is [liable] [subject to liabil-
ity] for injuries proximately caused by a defect in the article
which existed when the article left possession of the defend-
ant[s], provided that the injury resulted from a use of the
article that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant[s].
BAJI No. 9.00 (1972 Revision) (Supp. 1975) (bracketed material in
original).
70. See BAJI No. 9.01 (1973 Supp. Serv. Pamphlet No. 1).
71. If plaintiff assumes the risk of harm froin the use of a
defective product, he may not recover damages for an injury
resulting from such defect.
In order for the plaintiff to have assumed such risk, he
must have had actual knowledge of the defect and an appre-
ciation of the risk or danger involved in using the defective
product together with an understanding of the magnitude of
such risk and must thereafter have voluntarily and unreason-
ably proceeded to use the product to his injury.
In determining whether the plaintiff unreasonably pro-
ceeded to use the product, you should consider what a reason-
ably prudent person with the same knowledge would have
done under the same or similar circumstances.
For a person to act voluntarily, he must have freedom of
choice. This freedom of choice must come from circumstances
that provide him a reasonable opportunity, without violating
any legal or moral duty, to safely refuse to expose himself
to the danger in question.
In determining whether the plaintiff assumed such risk,
you may consider his maturity, intelligence, experience and
capacity, [and the requirements of his employment,] along
with all the other surrounding circumstances as shown by the
evidence.
See BAJI No. 9.02 (1974 Supp. Serv. Pamphlet No. 2).
Subsequently, however, in Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), the court, again through
Justice Sullivan, adopted a comparative negligence system, and noted:
[W] e have recognized in this state that this defense [assump-
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Drawing from the California cases, the plaintiff-appellant in
Sherrill clearly had more on his side discrediting the third part
of the Kohler instruction than just the notes of the Nebraska
Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions. While
the decisions of the California Supreme Court are certainly not con-
trolling in Nebraska, the Kohler court, in adopting strict tort, relied
heavily on California's Greenman opinion, utilizing the Restate-
tion of risk] overlaps that of contributory negligence to some
extent .... . "To simplify greatly, it has been observed . . .
that in one kind of situation, to wit, where a plaintiff unrea-
sonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk im-
posed by a defendant's negligence, plaintiff's conduct, al-
though he may encounter that risk in a prudent manner, is
in reality a form of contributory negligence ... "
Id. at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73, quoting from
Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 245, 418 P.2d 153,
156, 53 CaL Rptr. 545, 548 (1966).
[T] he defense of assumption of the risk is also abolished to the
extent that it is merely a variant of the former doctrine of
contributory negligence; both of these are to be subsumed
under the general process of assessing liability in proportion
to negligence.
Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
Later, the committee withdrew BAJI No. 9.02 due to an alleged
conflict between it and the express assumption of the risk instruction
adopted pursuant to Nga Li, which was intended for ordinary negli-
gence actions. See BAJI No. 9.02 (Supp. 1975). Specifically, some
questioned whether under the two instructions it was easier to assert
assumption of the risk in a strict liability action than in a negligence
action. Id, In Nga Li, a negligence action, the court did not discuss
how strict product liability, with its defenses, would fit into the com-
parative negligence system. See generally Feinberg, The Applicability
of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability
Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d (Can Oil
and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39 (1975); Freedman, The Com-
parative Negligence Doctrine Under Strict Liability: Defendant's Con-
duct Becomes Another "Proximate Cause" of Injury, Damage or Loss,
1975 INS. L.J. 468; 17 DE PAUL L. REv. 614 (1968). Cf. Comment, Col-
orado Comparative Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 46 U. COLO.
L. REv. 509 (1975); Note, Torts: Oklahoma's Uncharted Land of Com-
parative Negligence, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 122 (1974); Comment, Compar-
ative Negligence Legislation: Continuing Controversy Over the Doc-
trine of Assumption of the Risk in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REV. 79 (1973);
41 TEX. L. Rzv. 459 (1963). For a discussion of the Nebraska compar-
ative negligence statute and assumption of the risk see Note, Assump-
tion of Risk as a Defense in Nebraska Negligence Action Under the
Comparative Negligence Statute, 30 NEB. L. REv. 608 (1951). See also
Noel, supra note 6, at 118, for a discussion of Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.
2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Noel contends that Dippel indicates that
comparative negligence can be meshed with strict tort relatively
easily, although it may be difficult in theory. He concludes that the
jurors will diminish damages if they think the plaintiff is partly re-
sponsible, even if told that contributory negligence is not applicable.
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ment,72 Henningse 73 and Dean Prosser's landmark law review
article74 merely as additional support. In fact the Nebraska high
court paraphrased the excerpt from Greenman which Justice
Sullivan cited in Luque as correctly stating the law.7 5 This was
reaffirmed in Hawkins:
We laid down the broad rule [in Kohler] that "a manufacturer
is strictly liable in tort when an article he placed in the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect which causes an injury to a human being right-
fully using that product."76
In neither Hawkins nor Kohler did the Nebraska court cite or use
language similar to the passage from Greenman which, according
to Justice Sullivan in Luque, the California jury instruction
committee erroneously used to formulate their first instruction on
strict liability. There is no Nebraska case law requiring the plain-
tiff to prove he was unaware of the defect; moreover the instruction
upon which, in all probability, those in Kohler were based, has been
specifically disapproved by the same court that authored the
opinion upon which Nebraska's strict tort law is based. Clearly
the appellant in Sherrill had a more forceful basis for rejecting
the trial court's instruction than appears on the face of the opinion.
IV. ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK AS A DEFENSE
TO STRICT TORT
Defenses to strict tort where the defendant was obviously
aware,77 although not necessarily appreciative of, the defect create
anomalies. Is the manufacturer to be held to the duty of designing
The Eighth Circuit recently refused to apply Nebraska's compara-
tive negligence statute to a strict liability case:
We additionally observe the application of the Nebraska
comparative negligence statute would, under the language of
the statute, be extremely confusing and inappropriate in a
strict liability case....
Plaintiff's suggestion to instruct the jury to apply some
form of comparative fault is better directed to the state court
and Nebraska legislature in the first instance.
Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976).
72. RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
73. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 248, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
74. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 IxNN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
75. See pp. 707-08 supra.
76. 190 Neb. at 559, 209 N.W.2d at 652 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
77. See Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of
Risk in the Products Liability Era, 9 INT'L Soc'Y oF BARRISTERs Q. 15
(1974).
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a reasonably safe product, and then the plaintiff precluded from
recovery even though the injury was one which the duty was
intended to prevent?78 Specifically, if, as with the unshielded
auger in Sherrill, the product was designed defectively, should
the manufacturer be relieved of liability even if the injured plain-
tiff knew of the danger? In one case, involving a power punch
press, the court stated:
The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed
demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave
such a critical phase of his manufacturing process to the haphazard
conduct of the ultimate purchaser. The only way to be certain that
such devices will be installed on all machines-which clearly the
public interests requires-is to place the duty on the manufacturer
where it is feasible for him to do so.79
One author asserts that even warning the public may not be
enough:
[W]here a manufacturer knows of a danger not generally appreci-
ated by the public, could correct that danger, but instead merely
places a warning on the product, the product may still be consid-
ered unreasonably dangerous. Such an interpretation would be
consistent with a purpose of strict liability, promoting greater care
in the production of goods, and thereby providing more effective
public protection.8S
Clearly the thrust of the above arguments is to compel the
manufacturer to make his product safe.8 1 However there are
78. See Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) (re-
jecting contributory negligence as a defense); cf. Bahlman v. Hudson
Motor Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
It is undoubtedly true that the negligence of the driver caused
the car to overturn, but defendant's representations were not
for the purpose of avoiding an accident, but in order to avoid
or lessen the serious damages that might result therefrom.
. . . The particular construction of the roof of defendant's car
was represented as protection against the consequences of just
such careless driving as actually took place. Once the antici-
pated overturning of the car did occur, it would be illogical
to excuse defendant from responsibility for these very conse-
quences.
Id. at 689, 288 N.W. at 312 (emphasis added). Bahlman also rejected
contributory negligence as a defense in that particular case.
79. 60 N.J. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285.
80. Note, supra note 6, at 307. Compare with RESTATEiVIENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965).
81. See also Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (obviousness of lack of safety device did not pre-
clude jury finding unreasonable risk); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc.,
29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1973) manu-
facturer did not do enough to insure safety devices were installed by
the machine's third owner); Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247
A.2d 603 (1968) (absence of safety device constituted defective design
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counterquestions as to how safe a product should be made to pro-
tect a careless consumer. If too much is required, consumers, espe-
cially those with low incomes, may be prevented from purchasing
the product.
8 2
Perhaps then, a balancing aspect must prevail. Professor Robert
Keeton has asked:
Should we not instead say that the defendant's negligence unfairly
confronted plaintiff with a hard choice in which exposure to
defendant's negligently created risk seemed the lesser evil and that,
therefore, the defendant should be liable?8
3
This choice element receives support in comment n to Restate-
ment section 402A,84 where the plaintiff must voluntarily, as well
as unreasonably, proceed to encounter a known danger.8 5 The
Restatement's general approach to assumption of risk confirms this:
The plaintiff's acceptance of the risk is not to be regarded as volun-
tary where the defendant's tortious conduct has forced upon him
a choice of courses of conduct, which leaves him no reasonable
alternative to taking his chances.. . . The existence of an alterna-
tive course of conduct which would avert harm, or protect the right
or privilege, does not make the plaintiff's choice voluntary, if the
alternative is one which he can not reasonably be required to
accept. 86
One given example of an unreasonable choice which could preclude
finding assumption of the risk concerned a girl who was on a date.
Her companion started drinking heavily and she had a choice of
continuing riding in the drunkard's car or .to get out in a particu-
only where injury of type normally expected from normal product
use); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 971, 326 N.E.2d
74 (1975) (manufacturer had nondelegable duty to install safety de-
vices on industrial equipment).
82. The layman's probable inclination to hold the manufacturer
liable for all losses on the theory that he is better able to pay.
is simply not practical. Such reasoning ignores the "economic
facts of life." It is not the "deep-pocketed manufacturer" who
will bear the loss imposed upon him-rather, it is the public
who will have to pay as consumers.
Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct,
1968 UTAH L. REv. 267, 284. Cf. Symposium: Products Liability:
Economic Analysis and the Law, 38 U. CHm. L. Rmr. 1 (1970). See also
McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CH. L.
REV. 3, 40-42, 50-51 (1970); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 205 (1973); R. Pos=r., ECONOmc ANALYSIS OF LAW §§
4.5, -. 14, -.15 (1973).
83. Keeton, supra note 6, at 71. Cf. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law
of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17, 68 (1961).
84. See note 64 supra.
85. Cf. Noel, supra note 6, at 126-28.
86. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 496E, comment c (1965).
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larly undesirable area. It was suggested that the choice to continue
traveling was neither voluntary nor unreasonable.8 7
Another form of compulsion, economic duress, has also been held
not to preclude a finding of assumption of risk in a negligence
case. 8 However, a federal court in the same jurisdiction has held
that assumption of the risk did not bar recovery in strict tort where
the plaintiff was subjected to economic duress.8 9 In Messick v.
General Motors Corp.,90 the plaintiff drove a new automobile over
fifteen thousand miles but constantly had problems with the front
end wobbling.9 1 After taking the car to the dealer eight times
with unsatisfactory results, he took it to a private mechanic, who
also could not fix the problem, but who did advise the owner that
continuing to drive the car in its condition was dangerous.9 2 The
owner then demanded that General Motors replace the vehicle, but
he continued to use it because it was essential to his business.9 3
After being injured when the car went into a ditch, plaintiff sued
on negligence and strict tort grounds.9 4
The court found the negligence count barred by voluntary
assumption of the risk,95 but in reviewing comment n to Restate-
ment section 402A, the appellate court upheld the jury verdict for
the plaintiff on the strict tort count because the plaintiff was act-
ing under economic duress in that he had to continue using the
automobile to earn his living.90 Significant to the decision was
the plaintiff's extensive and mandatory use of the vehicle in his
work and the relatively large amount of his income he had com-
mitted to financing the automobile during the period he was seek-
ing satisfaction from the manufacturer.
The concept of duress as a factor in negligence is not new .1 7
In Clayards v. Dethick,98 sewer contractors dug a trench across
87. Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1, 17 (1966).
88. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
89. See Comment, Economic Coercion as Plaintiff's Defense to Volenti Non
Fit Injuria in Strict Liability Actions, 4 ST. MARY's L.J. 379 (1972).
90. 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972) (Texas law). But see Henderson v. Ford
Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); Note, Henderson v. Ford Motor
Co.: Defense and Proof of Defect Limits to Recovery In Product
Liability Actions, 29 Sw. L.J. 644 (1975).




95. Id. at 489.
96. Id. at 494.
97. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.
L. REv. 122, 154-59 (1961).
98. 116 Eng. Rep. 932 (Q.B. 1848).
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the entrance to a stable.9 " A stable worker tried to lead a horse
over the ditch, but the animal slipped and was killed.100 The trial
court submitted the defendants' negligence to the jury and also
observed that:
[I]t could not be the plaintiff's duty to refrain altogether from
coming out of the mews [stable] merely because the defendants
had made the passage in some degree dangerous: that the defend-
ants were not entitled to keep the occupiers of the mews in a state
of siege till the passage was declared safe, first creating a nuisance
and then excusing themselves by giving notice that there was some
danger: though, if the plaintiff had persisted in running upon a
great and obvious danger, his action could not be maintained.' 0 '
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and defendants
appealed.
Plaintiff's attorneys argued that the trial court's leaving of the
question of plaintiff's fault to the jury was correct as "[h] e could
not afford to keep his horse at home. 10 2 Queen's Bench affirmed
the lower court, Lord Coleridge remarking, "the plaintiff was not
bound to abstain from pursuing his livelihood because there was
some danger.'1
03
Although economic duress has not been addressed by the
Nebraska high court, choice in relation to assumption of the risk
has. In Schwab v. Allou Corp.,10 4 an elderly woman slipped on
the icy steps of her apartment and was injured. 0 5 The trial court
found for the plaintiff and the defendants appealed. 0 6 Defend-
ants contended the plaintiff assumed the risk of the icy steps as
a matter of law.10 7 The court found no assumption of the risk
involved:
The evidence shows that both the front and rear exits were icy.
The evidence does not show any freedom of choice to the plaintiff
with respect to leaving the apartment. Assumption of risk is predi-
cated upon an implied consent to be treated negligently. If the
person against whom the doctrine is applied is deprived of a
choice in the matter, the risk is not assumed, although it may be
encountered.'08
This reasoning was reaffirmed in Makovika v. Lukes,10 9 where
99. Id. at 932-33.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 933-34.
102. Id. at 934.
103. Id. at 935.
104. 177 Neb. 342, 128 N.W.2d 835 (1964).
105. Id. at 343, 128 N.W.2d at 837.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 351, 128 N.W.2d at 841.
108. Id. at 352, 128 N.W.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
109. 182 Neb. 168, 153 N.W.2d 733 (1967).
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the court also appears to have adopted the Restatement formu-
lation.110
This reasoning certainly has appeal when applied to the Sherrill
case. In the past two years as lead time for new farm equipment
increased, farmers became increasingly satisfied to obtain any new
or used piece, of a particular item. A "buyer's market" did not
exist in most farm products whereby the purchaser could freely
shop for the ideal implement. 1 '
The alternative to new equipment is to purchase used items,
however older items are even less likely to have safety fea-
tures. 1 2 It would be highly impractical to do without in a situ-
ation like that in Sherrill where the alternative is time-consuming
and exhausting manual labor as well as decreased production.
110. The Restatement provides:
Necessity of Voluntary Assumption
(1) A plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he vol-
untarily accepts the risk.
(2) The plaintiff's acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if
the defendant's tortious conduct has left him no reasonable al-
ternative course of conduct in order to
(a) avert harm to himself or another, or
(b) exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the
defendant has no right to deprive him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965). Cf. Bitsos v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1972). See also Farmers Co-op
Elevator Ass'n v. Strand, 382 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1967) (Nebraska law);
W. PRosSER, supra note 3, § 68, at 450-53; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ToRTs § 55, at 311-13 (2d ed. 1955).
111. The price of farm machinery increased 16% from 1973 to 1974, and
23% from 1974 to 1975. A 10 to 11% increase is projected for 1976;
however, manufacturers appear to be rebuilding inventories as de-
mand slackens. NEBRASKA FARmER, Jan. 3, 1976, at 14. Another pe-
riodical notes that 12% fewer tractors were sold in 1974 than in 1973,
but that "[m]ore units would have sold, . . . but the pipeline was
drained dry in 1973 and they couldn't build them fast enough to fill
all orders last year." SUCCESSFUL FARMING, Apr., 1975, at 14.
112. One study noted that an informal survey showed: "Most V-belt drives
were unshielded, even on machines of recent vintage .... Most PTO
shafts on new machines are shielded, but on many units the stub shaft
shield, where the shaft connects to the elevator, is in need of improve-
ment." Farm Dep't, National Safety Council, supra note 18, at 33.
Lead time for safer designs to be implemented may also be a prob-
lem. One study of Michigan and Ohio farm accidencts concludes: "It
takes 10 years after a new tractor design is provided before it is in-
volved in as much as 50 percent of the total tractor use by employees
in Michigan and Ohio." H. Doss & R. Pfister, Nature and Extent of
Farm Machinery Use in Relation to Frequency of Accidents in Michi-
gan and Ohio 22, Sept., 1972 (Agricultural Engineering Dep't, Michigan
State University).
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On the other side, the manufacturer deserves adequate notice
as to his exposure. Once a court finds economic duress which pre-
cludes voluntary assumption of a particular product risk, the manu-
facturer has clear notice as to what his manufacturing methods and
designs must encompass.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Sherrill court justified its approval of the trial
court's instructions by way of previous Nebraska case law, there
appears to have been sufficient basis upon which those instructions
could have been disapproved.
Whether the instructions were prejudicial to the plaintiff is not
altogether clear because the court was unimpressed with plaintiff's
case and statements at the trial. Arguably, however, Sherrill may
have been forced to encounter the danger of the rotating auger due
to lack of a feasible alternative.
In future Nebraska strict liability cases, the trial court should
revise the Kohler instruction, deleting "unaware of." Not only is
this in line with the law according to Greenman and the holding
in Kohler, but any possibility of a subtle shift of the burden of
proof is removed.
Finally those involved in litigating the products liability case
may address the assumption of the risk issue more in terms of free
choice to avoid the anomalous situation addressed in Bexiga. This
may necessitate a revision of Nebraska Jury Instruction No. 202A
and 3.31, not necessarily using "choice" specifically, but to reflect
Restatement section 402A, comment n and section 496E which
define the defense in terms of "voluntarily" and "reasonably"
encountering the risk.
Thomas Holmes '77
